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Why New Business Development Projects Fail? Coping with the Differences of 
Technological versus Market Knowledge 
Abstract 
Managing through projects has become important for generating new knowledge to cope with 
technological and market discontinuities. This paper examines how the fit between the creation 
of technological and market knowledge and important project management characteristics, i.e. 
project autonomy and completion criteria, influences the success of new business development 
(NBD) projects. In-depth longitudinal case research on NBD-projects commercialised during the 
period 1993-2003 in the consumer electronics industry highlights that project management 
characteristics focusing only on the creation of technological knowledge contributed to the 
failure of those NBD-projects that required new market knowledge as well. The findings indicate 
that senior management support and engaging in an alliance with partners possessing 
complementary market knowledge can offset this misalignment of the organisation of NBD-
projects.   
 
Keywords: project management; new business development; exploitation-exploration; 
knowledge; new product development; strategic alliances; sales force 
 4
Introduction 
In today’s fast-paced, knowledge-based environments competitive advantages erode at an 
ever-increasing rate. Companies need to continuously develop new business opportunities to 
tackle technological and market discontinuities. However, the managerial and organisational 
structures of most firms are primarily catered towards exploitation activities like refining 
products and processes. These structures do not support the requirements for exploring new 
business opportunities.1 Managers therefore increasingly use projects to create new businesses.  
A key aspect of New Business Development (NBD-) projects is the management of 
knowledge.2 Research has shown that project success is enhanced if project management 
characteristics are aligned with the project’s activity.3 Previous studies have made a distinction 
between projects that develop exploitative or incremental innovations versus exploratory or 
radical innovations.4 Radical innovations require both new technological knowledge and new 
market knowledge, while incremental innovations use and leverage existing technological and 
market knowledge.5  
However, Danneels suggested that an important distinction should be made between 
technological and market knowledge, as it has been argued that NBD-projects might create one 
type of knowledge and leverage another type of knowledge.6 Technological knowledge refers to 
knowledge associated with products, technologies and/ or processes. Market knowledge refers to 
knowledge associated with targeting customer sets, entering markets, distribution channels, 
marketing approaches, and business models.7 New business development is the process of 
linking the technological and market knowledge together.8 Although the two types of knowledge 
are intertwined, their project management requirements and implications for the wider 
organisational context could differ (see Exhibit 1).9  
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----------------------------------------- 
Insert Exhibit 1 here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
The distinction between the newness of technological and market knowledge is important 
for at least two reasons. First, both types of knowledge reside in different departments (R&D 
versus marketing/ sales). This might have consequences for the autonomy of projects in terms of 
leveraging knowledge. Second, the timing of development differs for both types of knowledge. 
Knowledge creation involves learning-by-doing.10 Yet, experimenting with market approaches 
and distribution channels will take place after market introduction, while practicing with 
products and technologies is done before market introduction. This suggests that project 
completion criteria might be different for creating technological versus market knowledge.  
Given the limited insight in the consequences of technological and market knowledge for 
NBD-projects, we will address the following research question: How does creation of 
technological and market knowledge influence project management characteristics of NBD-
projects? By doing so, we address the role of projects as focal points of knowledge creation and 
integration and provide insights into the conditions for the successful management of NBD-
projects. We focus our longitudinal research on new business development projects in a large 
incumbent firm in the consumer electronics industry. 
Our findings highlight that technological and market knowledge should have a different 
effect on project autonomy. By doing so, we extend previous research that has focused on the 
distinction between exploitative versus exploratory innovations and its effect on project 
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autonomy.11 Second, building upon Danneels’ work, we show the timing and duration of 
development differs between market and technological knowledge.12 Our findings indicate that 
the creation of market knowledge is likely to continue after market introduction, i.e. during the 
commercialisation phase. Extending the managing-through-projects approach to the 
commercialisation phase enhances the success of NBD-projects requiring new market 
knowledge. Third, our research shows that two strategies can be applied to off-set deficiencies in 
project management. Top management support can be used to prolong the project approach and 
to shield the project from organisational pressures to exploit. Our findings also indicate that 
strategic alliances with partners possessing complementary market knowledge significantly 
shorten the time to acquire new market knowledge for NBD-projects. 
 
Literature review 
Innovation is not only the creation of new knowledge, but also the recombination with 
existing knowledge.13 The processes of creating new knowledge versus leveraging existing 
knowledge are referred to as exploration and exploitation. Exploration is the act of creating 
knowledge that is new to the firm through activities such as experimentation, innovation, search 
and variation. Exploitation is the act of using knowledge existing in the firm and is associated 
with implementation, efficiency, production and refinement.14 NBD-projects call for both the 
exploration and the exploitation of knowledge.15 Exploration and exploitation require, however, 
different styles of management and organisational arrangements.16  
Several studies have been investigating how to manage the creation and transferring of 
knowledge in the context of new business development.17 Yet, these studies did not take into 
account the effect the type of knowledge has on managing NBD-projects, even though it has 
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been argued that technological and market knowledge have different outcomes for 
organisations.18 The benefits of, among others, cross-functional teams, project autonomy, and 
stage-gated development processes for the successful management of projects are well 
established.19 This paper explicitly focuses the relationship between project management 
characteristics and technological and market knowledge. Success rates of NBD-projects are 
enhanced if project autonomy is aligned with the degree of exploration of projects.20 This 
suggests connecting project autonomy with the degree of exploration of technological and 
market knowledge. Studies have also shown that exploration and project management practices 
change over the project’s life-cycle.21 This suggests linking project completion criteria to the 
phase in which exploration of technological and market knowledge occurs, as a prime objective 
of NBD-projects is the creation of new knowledge.  
 
Degree of exploration of technological and market knowledge and project autonomy 
The degree of project autonomy influences to what extent the exploration and the 
exploitation of knowledge is enhanced. The higher the project’s autonomy, the more precedence 
the project takes over various functional areas and the development of its knowledge base.22 A 
high degree of project autonomy stimulates the exploration of knowledge, as it shields the 
project from organisational inertia and knowledge bases.23 At the same time, higher degrees of 
project autonomy make learning and transferring knowledge between the project and the 
organisation more difficult, because of the relative distance between the project and 
organisational units.24 Providing low degrees of autonomy to an NBD-project limits the ability to 
explore new knowledge, but enhances the possibility to leverage existing knowledge and 
resources from the parent organisation.25 Autonomy could, inter alia, be increased by using 
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heavyweight leaders, by placing a project in physically distinct location, or by increasing the 
reporting level.26 
Figure 1 depicts a conceptual framework of four idealised types of projects linking the 
degree of technological and market knowledge newness to project autonomy. Projects requiring 
new technological and market knowledge (see Figure 1, quadrant 1) benefit the most from 
autonomy, as separating a project from the organisational context facilitates learning within the 
project.27 A typical structure for such radically new projects would be some sort of venture 
unit.28  
 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
Product improvement projects that exploit both existing technological and existing 
market knowledge benefit from staying close to the mainstream of the organisation to maximise 
the potential for leveraging knowledge already present within the firm (see Figure 1, quadrant 4). 
For these projects a functional or lightweight project type is preferred, which receives very little 
autonomy.29 Project members in this type of project divide their time between ongoing activities 
in their functional department and the project. As such, these employees are in the best position 
to leverage relevant knowledge and resources from their functional departments. Several authors 
argue that NBD-project success is significantly enhanced if projects make use of the firm’s 
existing sales force and distribution channels.30 
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Projects exploring technological knowledge and exploiting market knowledge require a 
medium degree of autonomy (see Figure 1, quadrant 2). These projects need autonomy for the 
development of technological knowledge,31 but need lower degrees of autonomy to exploit the 
available market knowledge. We suggest, therefore, an intermediate solution with medium 
degrees of autonomy for the project, which leaves room for both exploitation and exploration.   
In a similar vein, projects needing exploration of market knowledge and exploitation of 
technological knowledge would benefit most from a medium degree of autonomy (see Figure 1, 
quadrant 3). Too close cooperation with marketing and sales might constrain the project’s ability 
to explore market knowledge, and have a negatively impact on project performance.32 This 
suggests that the NBD-project needing exploration of market knowledge should receive a certain 
degree of autonomy from sales organisations.  
Besides exploring new knowledge internally, NBD-projects could also use strategic 
alliances to develop the missing knowledge and capabilities. Previous research has shown that 
partnerships with complementary resources and capabilities increase chances for success and 
competitive advantage.33 Using a partnership could speed up the development process and 
significantly reduce investment costs.34 Furthermore, it could also solve the potential conflict 
between requirements of technological versus market knowledge in NBD-projects, as partners 
could be responsible for one type of knowledge, while the project is focusing on the other type of 
knowledge. 
 
Phase in the NBD-process in which knowledge creation occurs and project completion criteria 
Projects are temporary structures created to achieve a certain goal.35 This suggests 
defining clear project completion criteria. NBD-projects have the objective to explore new 
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products/ technologies, and/ or explore new markets, for the firm.36 Project completion criteria 
should, therefore, be aligned with the process of the exploration of technological and market 
knowledge. Scholars have previously argued that NBD-projects end when a newly developed 
product is introduced on the market.37 This view limits the exploration of both technological and 
market knowledge to the development phase preceding market introduction. We argue, however, 
the exploration of technological and market knowledge end at different points in time.  
Following Thornhill and Amit, we identify three phases in the process of new business 
development (see Figure 2).38  The development phase, ranging from the conception of ideas to 
the introduction of developed products or services on the market. When products are introduced 
on the market, the project enters the commercialisation phase, running from market introduction 
until profitability is achieved (i.e. when cumulative profits surpass investment costs).39 The final 
phase is the business phase, when the project has become a business and is self-sustainable. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
The exploration of technological knowledge is mainly confined to the development 
phase, with exploratory technological activities such as prototype and product development, and 
building the (trial) production line. Before the product is approved for market introduction, the 
end result of the technological development trajectory in terms of a working product and process 
are usually tested on aspects such as durability and quality.40 At the moment of market 
introduction the product and production line are technically complete, requiring little additional 
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development of technological knowledge. The subsequent commercialisation phase calls for 
exploitation of technological knowledge in order to increase the efficiency of the production 
process and to refine the product. Hence, projects needing only the exploration of technological 
knowledge should be completed after the development phase ending at market introduction (see 
Figure 1, quadrant 2).41 
The exploration of market knowledge also starts during the development phase with 
activities such as gaining knowledge about customer preferences and how to reach and target 
potential customers (see Figure 2). Yet, exploration requires learning-by-doing, which for market 
knowledge can to some extent only be learned during the commercialisation phase when 
products are actually sold. This is a prime difference with technological knowledge creation in 
which case one can experiment before products are actually sold on the market. The exploration 
of market knowledge continues during the commercialisation phase, when for example concepts 
are tested in the marketplace and distribution channels are developed. Based also on customer 
feedback the market approach might be frequently changed during this phase.42 NBD-projects 
requiring new market knowledge should, therefore, only be completed at the end of the 
commercialisation phase (see Figure 1, quadrants 1 and 3). At the end of this phase, the project 
has become self-sustainable and does not need protection of top management or a set of special 
criteria to further explore market knowledge. Concluding, the different phases in which 
exploration of technological and market knowledge occurs (see Figure 2) suggests project 
completion criteria for NBD-projects should be contingent upon the phase in which exploration 
of technological and market knowledge takes place (see Figure 1). 
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Methods 
The research reported here is based on an in-depth, longitudinal case study of new 
business development projects at the DOMUS division of ELECTRAi, a major manufacturer of 
consumer electronics. By selecting projects within a single division, we were able to reduce 
potential confounding effects of the industry and the firm. This allowed us to best observe our 
phenomena of interest, namely how the creation of technological and market knowledge and 
project management practices influence the success of NBD-projects. To observe the changes in 
organisational behaviour over time and to gain deeper understanding of the role of technological 
and market knowledge creation in managing NBD-projects, we choose qualitative methods 
instead of quantitative methods. The selected method increases the validity of our study, but at 
the same time we acknowledge that we might loose possible generalisation to other industry 
contexts.  
The projects were selected based on the exploration of technological and market 
knowledge (see Figure 3). All projects needed to have reached the commercialisation phase. To 
measure the degree of exploration we first asked respondents to what extent the product/ 
technologies and markets were existing to the firm, new-to-the-firm, -industry, or -world. 
Second, we asked them to explain what aspects where new, because something that is new to the 
firm does not necessarily involve much exploration. For example, a firm can enter a new market 
segment, but might use existing distribution channels and market approaches. Third, we 
investigated company documents to look for statements on actual explorative behaviour. For 
example, if minutes of meetings stated that the project team was developing medical knowledge 
to sell their products through pharmacies as opposed to electronic retail stores, this would be 
classified as exploration of market knowledge (see also Table 1). Using multiple sources of 
                                                 
i  Due to confidentiality agreements, we changed the name of the company. 
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evidence allowed us to develop a more fine-grained measure of the degree of exploration needed 
than would be possible through survey research.  
We used several rounds of data collection and a variety of internal company documents 
like minutes of meetings and business plans, and external documents to analyse the projects. 
Additionally, we interviewed several key project members, division executives, R&D directors, 
and sales managers for the projects to triangulate the findings with different sources. Appendix 1 
provides more detail on our research methods. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
Research setting 
ELECTRA is a large multinational company that consists of several relatively 
autonomous product divisions. Besides the product divisions, national and regional sales 
organisations were part of the company. Because many of DOMUS’ products are sold through 
the same retail stores, a single sales person of DOMUS offers the whole range of DOMUS’ 
products to a retail store instead of having different sales persons for each product line. 
At the time of investigation, DOMUS consisted of a business group focusing on 
household products and one focusing on personal care products. The business group of 
household products had a diverse product portfolio, mostly in increasingly saturated markets. 
Market growth had slowed down to around 2-3 percent and there was an increasing trend 
towards commoditisation. Sales growth was mainly achieved through market share battles, but 
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management recognised opportunities for entering new markets and for radically redefining 
existing product/market propositions. The business group of personal care products consisted of 
a rather narrow, but highly profitable product portfolio that was also confronted with decreasing 
sales growth. Yet, the opportunities for boosting growth were markedly different, as growth 
opportunities were primarily in addressing new product categories.   
DOMUS consisted of several business units that each contained a few business lines, 
which consisted of one or more product lines. Units were defined based on relatedness of product 
(categories). The business units were responsible for NBD-activities. The NBD-project managers 
reported to a business line manager within these business units. NBD-projects within DOMUS 
were cross-functional, and included both engineers as well as marketers. DOMUS used 
heavyweight projects for the NBD-projects we investigated, but with relatively junior managers 
leading the projects. The engineers and marketeers were assigned fulltime to a project, and had 
clear responsibilities toward the project manager, although they formally reported to their 
functional units. The projects were organised and the development activities executed according 
to a standardised approach that was described in a manual. A senior project manager of Skin 
pointed out: “…we followed a very strict process, which was actually a best-in-class process with all the stages, 
gates, and milestones, but this was very much driven from the [technological] development side. On the marketing-
side it was very loose.”   
 
Case study findings 
We investigated eight NBD-projects within DOMUS. These projects were executed 
during the period 1993-2003. Table 1 presents an overview of the investigated projects. Project 
Drink developed a segment of an existing market, while others targeted a market completely new 
for ELECTRA (projects Health and Skin), or focused on markets that were geographically 
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relatively new for ELECTRA (project Cook). Several projects (Drink, Oral, and Health) made 
use of an alliance to build the new business. All projects fitted within the defined strategy of 
DOMUS to manufacture mass electronic consumer goods for household or personal care use. 
The projects in our sample provided significant revenues. Projects Hair and Air achieved over 30 
million euros in annual turnover two years after market introduction, while project Drink has 
sold millions of products in the first four years after market introduction. Projects Fem and Oral 
have grown into businesses with annual sales well exceeding 100 million euros.  
 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
Degree of exploration of technological and market knowledge and project autonomy 
In the case of the exploration of technological knowledge, previous research suggests a 
heavyweight project-type is preferred.43 Projects Fem and Hair grew into successful businesses 
by adopting this structure. All investigated projects and businesses within DOMUS were in the 
area of consumer electronics, suggesting relatively similar technological bases. This allowed 
project teams to build on the capabilities of the engineers to create electronic products for 
household use. The heavyweight structure provided projects with sufficient autonomy to create 
new knowledge, while the project was still sufficiently integrated with other units to leverage 
existing capabilities. The projects used employees from the R&D departments which further 
facilitated the access to relevant knowledge and capabilities. Project Cook received more 
autonomy than the other investigated projects. Instead of the standard approach of developing the 
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project at one of the operational business units, project Cook was situated in Asia. This limited 
project Cook’s access to organisational knowledge and support, as the project was far away from 
the company’s business units in Europe. As a result, the project had to develop many of the 
competencies regarding manufacturing and testing the product itself. It did not draw on 
employees from R&D departments, but hired new personnel. This resulted in long lead times and 
poor initial product quality, which had adverse effects on the project’s performance. 
Although the projects’ degrees of autonomy were adequate for the exploration of 
technological knowledge, it did create problems for the exploration of market knowledge. Most 
projects operated autonomously from the sales organisations.  A sales manager pointed out: “The 
BU sometimes developed things without full commitment and involvement of the sales organisations. There was a 
somewhat isolated attitude, in the sense of wait until it is finished and we’ll show you. Here and there were some 
walls in the organisation over which something was thrown from time to time.”  The task of NBD-projects 
was to explore what should be done regarding the market, in terms of new distribution channels 
and new marketing approaches. The sales organisations were responsible for exploitation in the 
sense that they had to sell the products through the new distribution channels etc. The sales 
representatives had, however, neither the time nor the resources to learn how to sell the 
developed product through new distribution channels. The projects received time and resources 
to search new knowledge, but sales employees did not receive time and resources to learn and 
practice. In an interview a business manager of Oral pointed out: “An important market for Oral was 
country X. The average age of the sales employees was around 50 and they had been selling kitchen appliances for 
25-30 years. Could we ask of these sales employees to suddenly have a talk with specialists about inter-dental 
cleaning?” This proved to be too difficult and currently project Oral still has its own sales force 
and is managed autonomously from other business units. 
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Several projects tried to compensate for their lack of market knowledge by engaging in 
an alliance with a partner possessing the required market knowledge (see Table 1). The business 
manager of Project Oral continued: “That’s one of the reasons we established the alliance and did the 
acquisition. It proved too difficult to build up our own competences and network regarding professional 
endorsement by medical specialists.” The alliance partner did have the competences and network. 
There was, however, some overlap on the technological side, which led to disputes between both 
parties on how certain parts should be constructed and who should develop it. Combined with the 
somewhat diverging interests and the lack of alliance experience of both companies, this led to 
disbanding the alliance. Project Drink’s alliance, however, was a major success. Project Drink 
used a new business model in which revenues from so called consumables were the main profit 
drivers instead of the core product (recall Polaroid’s razor/blade strategy discussed in the theory 
section in which camera prices were kept low to stimulate demand, while the profit was made on 
the film, i.e. the consumable). But project Drink had limited experience with selling and 
marketing these consumables. The partner did have a background in these consumables and took 
care of developing and selling the consumable, while project Drink handled the development and 
selling of the core product. This complementarity made them ideal partners. Establishing the 
alliance was, however, a slow and painstaking negotiation process, because of the limited 
experience of DOMUS with such alliances. The success of this alliance contributed to the 
establishment of a corporate alliance office to capture and leverage knowledge on establishing 
alliances.   
Concluding, the autonomy of the project influenced to what extent projects were able to 
explore technological and market knowledge, and benefit from knowledge already existing in the 
firm. As suggested by the case study, a heavyweight project placed within the operational 
business units provides sufficient autonomy to develop new products, but is still able to leverage 
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relevant technological knowledge and capabilities. If a project receives more autonomy (e.g. 
Project Cook) it needed more time to develop technological knowledge, as it could not draw on 
available knowledge, skills, and personnel.  Regarding market knowledge, however, the 
investigated projects were too autonomous from the relevant sales organisations. By not being 
involved in the project, the sales organisations did not receive the time and resources to develop 
and experiment with novel market approaches. The case study indicates that strategic alliances 
are useful to decrease the time it takes to acquire new market knowledge and the time to achieve 
profitability. Projects Drink and Oral demonstrate the impact of such alliances, as they became 
major successes, while other projects exploring market knowledge (Air, Skin, and Cook) 
continued their struggle to find the right approach towards the market. 
   
Phase in the NBD-process in which exploration occurs 
A major difference between technological and market knowledge is when the exploration 
takes place. In our case study, the exploration of technological knowledge took place before 
market introduction. The product development ended with exposing the products to durability 
tests, which were performed before introduction on the market. Production processes were 
constructed and many trial runs were done before the project was given the green light to start 
manufacturing for first sales. Most projects benefited from testing facilities and capabilities the 
company already possessed. For projects Oral, Cook and Health existing tests were not 
applicable. A project manager of project Oral stated: “A lot of our standard tests were designed for a 
kitchen environment. Our product was however used in a bathroom, in which the atmosphere is warmer and moister. 
We had to learn how to test for this.” Project Cook faced similar problems, as it had to build up testing 
competencies in Asia. Despite difficulties with testing the product, these projects continued with 
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market introduction. The pressure to launch quickly led projects Cook, Health and Oral to 
prematurely introduce the products on the market, resulting in high recall rates for their products. 
The exploration of market knowledge also started during the development phase (see 
Figure 2). A project manager of project Skin commented on the market research: “It is a new 
business, how do you know how many we can sell? You can improve your guessing with more and better customer 
research and knowing how to understand the numbers. The problem was that we did not know how to interpret the 
numbers we got back, as we had no data to compare it to.” This lack of understanding of the market led to 
flaws in the project’s assumptions, product positioning and business model, which came to the 
surface during the commercialisation phase. In an interview, the project manager of Skin stated: 
“Two of the major reasons that brought Skin down were marketing and distribution. We found out that the average 
time it took a consumer to decide to purchase our product was three months, while for the average product DOMUS 
sold it is more in the area of two days. During that three month period you have to get your message out and 
convince potential consumers, as they will ask everybody from their friends to their doctor what they think of the 
product.” A former business manager of Oral also stressed the exploration of market knowledge 
still taking place: “The traditional way of DOMUS for a market introduction campaign was to execute just one 
brief mass marketing campaign and that is it. We had to learn that we regularly had to contact medical specialists to 
achieve professional endorsement.” 
From the case analysis it appears there was hardly any time left to create the required 
market knowledge once products had been introduced on the market, due to the imposed project 
completion criteria. During the commercialisation phase projects were managed according to 
criteria similar to managing existing businesses within DOMUS. First, projects had to use a 
mass-introduction strategy in multiple countries, which a project manager labelled the “do-it-right-
the-first-time approach”. A second criterion was that NBD-projects had to achieve profitability 
within 2 years, i.e. investment costs should be earned back within this 2-year period. A third 
criterion stated that projects needed to use their own revenues if they wanted to make additional 
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investments in exploration once products had been introduced on the market. In other words, 
projects were considered to be completed at the moment of market introduction. During the 
commercialisation phase these activities were viewed as emerging businesses, which were 
granted two years to achieve profitability levels comparable to other businesses. A project 
manager of Cook pointed out: “we performed relatively well on the milestones in the development phase, but 
that is one of the strengths of DOMUS. The bigger project Cook, however, was not handled in a project-like way. 
That was more the running of a daily business.”  
Of the eight investigated projects, Fem and Hair were the only two projects that did not 
need significant exploration of market knowledge (see Table 1 and Figure 3). These projects 
became instant successes, as they benefited from leveraging existing market knowledge bases. 
The criteria to view the project as completed at market introduction were aligned with the 
exploration of technological knowledge, which took place before market introduction.  
Out of the six projects that required exploration of market knowledge, only two projects 
became a success. The four failing projects were seriously constrained by the before-mentioned 
business criteria imposed on them during the commercialisation phase. Project Air, for example, 
used a mass-introduction strategy on multiple markets. After market introduction, the project 
experienced several problems with the business model, marketing approach and distribution 
channels. As a consequence, demand was far lower than expected and 80% of the production 
capacity remained unused. The project either needed significant investments to turn the tide or 
needed to write off the initial investments and continue on a smaller scale. Yet, the criteria 
imposed by top management did not allow these options, as projects only got two years to 
become profitable and were not entitled to financial support. 
The two successful projects (Drink and Oral) managed to offset these project completion 
criteria that were not aligned with exploration during the commercialisation phase. Project Drink 
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used an alliance for the exploration of market knowledge, i.e. the business model and market, 
and more importantly used a single test market to further explore if the developed product 
propositions and marketing campaigns are effective. In an interview an R&D manager pointed 
out: “What worked very well was using a single test market. It created success, which worked positively towards 
other markets. The idea was to keep it small, learn and use the experience gained in other markets. Once you have 
success it is easier to convince management to invest additional resources for launch in other countries.” The 
marketing manager of project Drink explained the exploration of market knowledge: “through 
project Drink we learned how to do this. Just testing it in the market and learn about optimal product positioning, 
marketing strategies and then executing it on a larger scale.” The number of products sold during the first 
year was three times higher than the most positive scenario, which shows the advantage of a 
project approach over a business approach in the case of exploration of market knowledge during 
the commercialisation phase.  
Project Oral became a success after almost 10 years of experimentation, learning, and 
development, resulting in significant investments and losses. The project completion criteria that 
were established for NBD-projects that reached the commercialisation phase (i.e. becoming 
profitable in two years) were, however, overruled by the responsible business manager. In an 
interview, a former project manager of Projects Air and Cook commented: “One of the most 
important things is creating the right environment and support for the new business. In personal care for example 
they committed themselves if they spotted an important opportunity. A good example is project Oral. The first five 
years were basically a disaster. Everybody in the organisation yelled that we should stop, as our product quality was 
inferior compared to the competition. But there was one manager who said these comments were fine and all that, 
but the project would continue.” The champion had sufficient authority and resources at his disposal to 
actually allow the project to continue. Other projects needing additional time to develop the 
markets also had champions, but the problem was that these champions moved to positions in 
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other BU’s or divisions due to job rotation mechanisms. The project manager continued: “Then 
you see the importance of a long-term champion. He was in that business unit for many years, while for other 
projects, every couple of years a new business manager arrived.” 
Several projects also found that in order to succeed in developing new markets, the sales 
organisations had to explore new ways of working. Although the autonomy of the project 
allowed the projects to explore freely and develop innovative approaches, it did not result in 
workable situations, as the sales force did not get the time or the incentives to learn how to 
operate successfully in these new environments. A sales manager commented : “At that time sales 
employees were not rewarded to introduce new products. Our trade partners received incentives to prioritise certain 
products, but not internally towards our sales force. Management just provided sales targets for each product.”  The 
consequence was that the sales organisations and the individual sales representatives favoured 
existing products over new products, as they required less effort to reach the sales targets than 
new products. Because neither the business units and projects nor the sales organisations 
received incentives to create the required market knowledge during the commercialisation phase, 
disputes arose frequently about who should pay for it. Fem, Hair and Drink were perceived as 
logical additions to the product portfolio and did not receive much resistance from the sales 
organisations. Cook was also a welcome addition to the product portfolio in the eyes of the sales 
organisations, but the sales organisations did not have the resources to support the market 
development for project Cook. On the contrary, one of the objectives of project Cook was to 
strengthen the sales organisations in Asia, which is the other way around. Projects Health, Skin, 
Oral and Air stretched the portfolio a bit more, as they all had a medical aspect in their business 
model, and some were a bit more niche marketing than usual within DOMUS. As pointed out, in 
particular the medical side with new distribution channels and professional endorsement created 
major challenges for the sales organisations, but no resources were made available to explore.  
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In summary, the used project completion criteria at DOMUS to view a project as a 
business when the commercialisation phase starts suited the projects primarily needing 
exploration of technological knowledge, i.e. quadrant 2 in Figure 3. NBD-projects requiring new 
market knowledge, however, would have significantly benefited from a managing-through-
projects approach during the commercialisation phase. Extending the project approach until 
profitability is achieved might have led more of these projects to success, because of the 
available time and resources to develop knowledge about the intended markets. The case study 
also points to the importance of including sales organisations in the project. This provides the 
project with access to the available knowledge stock in the sales organisation, and points to the 
relevance of providing sales organisations with time and resources to explore market knowledge. 
Our findings indicated that using strategic alliances or top management support could overcome 
misalignment of project completion criteria with the requirements for new market knowledge.  
 
Discussion of findings: Managing NBD-projects 
The NBD-projects in our sample were managed and organised in accordance with a focus 
on the exploration of technological knowledge. NBD-projects were placed in operating business 
units close to R&D and engineering departments, which gave them good access to technological 
knowledge. The standardised project management approach treated the NBD-projects as regular 
businesses after market introduction. This benefited projects that focused on the creation of 
technological knowledge and did not require new market knowledge (projects Fem and Hair). 
Projects needing exploration of market knowledge ran into severe problems because they did not 
receive the autonomy, the resources, and the time necessary to develop market knowledge during 
the commercialisation phase.44 Several NBD-projects requiring market knowledge during the 
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commercialisation phase, began cost-cutting programmes and opted for less innovative 
approaches to achieve profitability within the required two years. Moreover, top management 
demanded a launch strategy, in which products had to be introduced on many markets at the 
same time. This type of launch strategy maximises economies of scale, but leaves little time to 
experiment with different approaches.45 In line with our conceptual framework, the case findings 
highlight that a single approach towards NBD-projects does not do justice to the diversity of 
projects in terms of their required exploration of technological and market knowledge.  
 
Managerial implications 
Our findings highlight at least four important implications for senior and project 
management (see Table 2). 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
First, senior and project management have to recognise the differences between the 
exploration of technological versus market knowledge and match the project’s autonomy to the 
degree of exploration of both types of knowledge (see Figure 1). The degree of autonomy a 
project receives should increase when there is a greater need for development of technological 
and market knowledge. Higher project autonomy facilitates knowledge creation in the project, 
while tighter links between the project and mainstream businesses are beneficial if the project 
wants to benefit from existing knowledge.46 This suggests companies should have a range of 
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managerial and organisational arrangements for NBD-activities tied to the specific knowledge 
requirements of projects, instead of applying one standardised arrangement to all types of 
projects.47 Our case findings pointed out that a standardised approach aligned with exploration of 
technological knowledge significantly constrained NBD-projects requiring the development of 
market knowledge.  
Second, management should enable the exploration of market knowledge taking place 
during the commercialisation phase by setting project completion criteria that include this phase 
in the project (see Figures 1 and 2). This protects the project from increasing business pressures 
to show early results, and provides them with the opportunity to experiment with new 
approaches; two key aspects for the success of exploratory projects.48 Establishing project 
completion criteria provides clarity and a point-of-reference to both the organisational context 
and the project in terms of when exploratory behaviour is expected.49 It is, therefore, important 
to connect the project completion criteria to the timing and duration of the exploration of 
technological and market knowledge. 
Third, senior management support can offset some of these contingencies regarding 
project completion and autonomy. Figure 1 presents an idealised model that provides sufficient 
protection from business pressures for each type of project. We argued that a mismatch between 
autonomy/ completion criteria and knowledge requirements could result in increasing business 
pressure and higher chance of project failure. Yet, senior management supporters (champions) 
were able to protect projects from too much pressure.50 Project Oral’s champion, for example, 
allowed the project to undertake the necessary exploration even though organisational 
procedures suggested otherwise. However, support is often not a sustainable solution, as for 
example job rotation mechanisms can replace champions by new and perhaps less favourable 
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managers.51 For example, project Air suffered from replacement of their champion. Champions 
have thus positive effects on NBD-project success, but management should be aware of the 
potential negative consequences for the project if a champion is promoted or leaves.  
Fourth, another way of dealing with the conflicting forces of long development times for 
market knowledge versus increasing business pressures to show results is the use of strategic 
alliances to access complementary market knowledge. This significantly reduces development 
time and costs.52 It reduces the need to explore market knowledge during the commercialisation 
phase, which was one of the main contributors to project failure in our study. In particular if the 
existing sales force is not equipped for selling the newly developed products, management will 
have to invest substantial resources to build up a new sales force for the project. Using a strategic 
alliance (e.g. project Drink) could reduce or eliminate the need to build a new sales force. 
Fifth, the case study showed that senior management should devote significant attention 
to the impact NBD-projects have on the requirements for the company’s sales force. In the case 
of significant exploration of market knowledge, the existing sales force might have to learn new 
skills to successfully market the new product. If sales employees are judged against exploitative 
criteria (i.e. the need to achieve a certain amount of sales each year), they have little incentive to 
invest time and resources selling a product for which success is uncertain. Thus alignment of 
incentive structures for the sales force with the requirements of an NBD-project is an important 
factor in the ultimate success of the NBD-project.53 
 
 
Theoretical implications and conclusions 
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Several implications for theory also resulted from our findings. Previous studies have 
shown that project and organisational requirements differ for radical versus incremental 
innovations.54 Radical innovations have been classified as requiring both new technological 
knowledge and new market knowledge, while incremental innovations use and leverage existing 
knowledge. We complemented this literature by also addressing projects that either focus on new 
technological knowledge or new market knowledge (see Figure 1), and show that the managerial 
and organisational requirements differ for both types of projects.  
This more fine-grained description of NBD-projects contributes to knowledge and 
innovation literature by showing that technological and market knowledge differ in terms of 
timing when exploratory activities take place. Danneels argued that technological and market 
knowledge differ in terms of competence bases.55 Our findings indicate that exploring new 
technological knowledge takes place in the development phase preceding market introduction, 
while creating market knowledge takes for a large part place during the commercialisation phase 
(see Figure 2). This also points to the importance for more specifically addressing the 
commercialisation phase in product development and project management research. 
Finally, we complement project management literature by addressing the under-
researched relation between NBD-projects and their organisational context.56 In particular we 
show that NBD-projects exploring new markets can place significant demands on the company’s 
sales force to such an extent that it triggers organisational renewal. The demand for 
organisational renewal may be offset by alliance partners possessing complementary knowledge 
and capabilities. By doing so, we have contributed to the emerging debate on using alliances in 
NBD-projects. 
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Several future research issues also emerged from our findings. A logical next step would 
be to do large scale cross-sectional research to assess the generalisability of our findings. It 
would in particular be interesting to investigate the extent to which our findings apply to project-
based firms, projects in the service sector, and to firms in the so-called Complex Products and 
Systems (CoPS-) projects sectors, which develop unique one-off products and are often built to 
order.57 In the latter case, we expect the order in which both types of exploration takes place 
would be different, as selling and marketing would precede actual technological development. 
We invite further research to investigate possible other contingencies regarding the exploration 
of technological and market knowledge, like the internal organisation of a project and the type of 
project manager needed. 
In conclusion, we have put forward the argument that developing technological and 
market knowledge have an important impact on managing through projects. Our conceptual 
framework and case findings provide guidelines to enhance the success of NBD-projects in 
mass-manufacturing companies. We showed that aligning project autonomy and project 
completion criteria with the degree of required exploration of technological versus market 
knowledge is essential for successfully managing new business development projects. 
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APPENDIX I  Research methods 
Using multiple cases allowed us to replicate our findings and strengthened the validity of 
our research.58 The cases were selected based on a theoretical sampling logic following our 
primary object of interest, namely technological versus market exploration in the setting of 
NBD-projects. In the logic of Figure 1, projects were selected in quadrants 1, 2 and 3. 
Furthermore, we expect the exploration of market knowledge to continue during the 
commercialisation phase.  As such, the selected NBD-projects needed to have reached this phase. 
Third, the sample had to incorporate both successful and unsuccessful projects. We defined 
failure in terms of projects that were abandoned and success as projects that became major, 
profitable businesses - criteria that were only possible due to the long time-span which our study 
covered (1993-2003).  
During the 14-month period (2004-2005) in which the research was carried out we first 
sat down with management to identify the projects and key persons involved. These persons 
were approached for interviews and to provide documentation on the projects. Snowball 
sampling helped us to identify additional contacts. The first round of data collection involved 
publicly available information and divisional-level documents, such as annual reports, and 
strategy and budget documents, to gain insight into the situational context at the time of the 
projects.  
The second round of data collection concerned project-specific documents, like minutes 
of meetings, progress presentations to top management, strategy documents. For each project, the 
data was categorised into our main variables such as exploration of technological and market 
knowledge, relations with other parties (inside and outside the organisation), and performance of 
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the projects. Based on the documentation, case narratives were written for each project to 
describe the development of the projects over time.  
To provide a richer view of the projects, the third round of data collection included 
interviews with key project members. We developed an interview guide based on the categories 
used in the documentation process to cover the main topics. We used open-ended questions to 
invite respondents to talk about a subject instead of pushing them in a certain predefined 
direction. The semi-structured interviews lasted around 1½ hour each and were recorded, 
resulting in over 200 pages of transcripts. The transcripts were sent back to the interviewees for 
corrections and additions. In total we conducted 21 interviews (2-3 interviews on average per 
project). We selected key project members that had a good overview of the entire project and its 
relationship with the parent organisation (i.e. the project, R&D and marketing manager). We 
compared data from different sources to check for potential retrospective biases in our after-the-
fact interviews. A retrospective bias seemed to be slightly present with employees still working 
at that division who had participated in an unsuccessful project. The overall description they 
gave of the projects was similar, but some of these employees had a tendency to blame others for 
failure of the project. Using documentation and multiple informants allowed us to triangulate 
findings and control for retrospective biases in our interviews.59 The findings from the 
documents and the interviews were combined in a report on our findings. This report was 
discussed during a workshop with senior management to assess the validity of our findings. The 
feedback was included in a final report, which was presented to management. 
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FIGURE 1 Conceptual framework: knowledge types and project management 
characteristics 
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FIGURE 2 Exploration and exploitation of technological and market knowledge in 
subsequent phases of an NBD-project’s life cycle 
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FIGURE 3 Classification of the eight investigated NBD-projects 
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EXHIBIT 1 Technological versus market knowledge: The case of Polaroid and digital 
photography.60  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the 1980s, Polaroid invested heavily in the development of digital technology. Strongly 
supported by top management, the project developed leading-edge technological 
capabilities in digital imaging. The company’s processes and capabilities were geared 
towards the development of technological knowledge, which enhanced the successful 
development of digital imaging capabilities. However, the company did not become 
successful in digital imaging despite the successful development of technological 
knowledge. The primary reason was that Polaroid did not recognise the need for the 
exploration of market knowledge. Polaroid was at that time very successful in instant 
photography. Its business model was a so-called “razor/blade” strategy, in which the firm 
dropped prices of the camera to stimulate demand and subsequently made money on the 
film. However, digital imaging does not use film and as such digital camera’s needed new 
market knowledge in the form of new business models and distribution channels. Polaroid 
was also confronted with a new set of competitors, as (computer) electronics 
manufacturers also developed digital imaging capabilities. Due to Polaroid’s dominant 
managerial cognition and inertial ways of working that were strongly tied to their existing 
market knowledge, the company gradually lost its strengths in digital imaging and failed 
to capture the market. 
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TABLE 1 Knowledge creation and project success in the investigated projects 
 
Project Newness of technological knowledge Development of 
technological 
knowledge 
Newness of market knowledge Development 
of market 
knowledge 
Status 
(duration) 
Projects exploring technological and market knowledge 
Oral 
Product: new-to-the-firm 
Technologies: new-to-the-firm 
Production processes:  new-to-the-firm 
Internal, brought-in 
expertise, alliance, 
acquisition 
Market: new-to-the-firm  
Distribution channels: new-to-the-firm 
Market approach: new-to-the-firm 
Internal, alliance, 
acquisition 
Success 
(ongoing) 
Health 
Product: new-to-the-firm/ -world 
Technological concept: new-to-the-world 
Production processes: new-to-the-firm 
Internal, alliance 
Market: new-to-the-firm  
Distribution channels: new-to-the-firm 
Market approach: new-to-the-firm 
Internal Stopped  (after 3 years) 
Skin 
Product: new-to-the-world 
Technologies were leveraged and adapted 
Production processes: new-to-the-firm 
Internal 
Market: new-to-the-industry 
Distribution channels: new-to-the-industry 
Market approach: new-to-the-industry  
Internal Stopped  (after 4 years) 
Cook 
Product: new-to-the-firm 
Technologies were leveraged and adapted  
Production processes: new-to-the-firm. 
internal 
Market: new-to-the-firm  
Distribution channels: new-to-the-firm or 
underdeveloped 
Market approach: new-to-the-firm  
Internal Stopped  (after 4 years) 
Projects exploring technological knowledge and exploiting market knowledge 
Hair 
Product: new-to-the-firm 
Technologies could be leveraged and adapted 
Production processes: new-to-the-firm 
Internal 
Market: existing, but segment new-to-the-firm 
Distribution channels: existing 
Market approach: existing 
Internal Success (ongoing) 
Fem 
Product: new-to-the-firm 
Technologies could be leveraged and adapted 
Production processes: new-to-the-firm 
Internal 
Market: existing, but segment new-to-the-firm 
Distribution channels: existing 
Market approach: existing 
Internal Success (ongoing) 
Projects exploiting technological knowledge and exploring market knowledge 
Drink 
Product: variation of existing 
Technologies: leveraged and recombined 
Production processes: existing  
Internal 
Market: existing, but segment new-to-the-firm 
Distribution channels: new-to-the-firm 
Market approach: new-to-the-industry 
Alliance Success (ongoing) 
Air 
Product: existing 
Technology: bought in license  
Production processes: existing 
Internal, 
technological license 
bought 
Market: existing, but segment new-to-the-firm 
Distribution channels: new-to-the-firm 
Market approach: new-to-the-firm 
Internal Stopped  (after 5 years) 
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TABLE 2 Recommendations for managing NBD-projects 
 
1) Match the project’s autonomy to the newness of required technological and market 
knowledge (see Figure 1). The more development of technological and market 
knowledge is required, the higher should be the project’s autonomy. 
 
2) Align project completion criteria with the development of technological and market 
knowledge. As the development of market knowledge continues after market 
introduction, these activities should be managed through projects until profitability 
is achieved (see Figures 1 and 2). 
 
3) An organizational champion can be used to offset deficiencies in the project’s 
autonomy and project completion criteria. However, management support from a 
champion is often not a sustainable solution due to managerial job rotation. 
 
4) To speed up the development of market knowledge, projects can use strategic 
alliances with firms possessing complementary market knowledge. 
 
5) Align sales force incentives with NBD-project requirements. Proactive sales force 
involvement and the development of new sales skills are essential for successfully 
commercialising NBD-projects that require new market knowledge. 
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